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Abstract. Web password recovery, enabling a user who forgets their
password to re-establish a shared secret with a website, is very widely
implemented. However, use of such a fall-back system brings with it
additional vulnerabilities to user authentication. This paper provides a
framework within which such systems can be analysed systematically,
and uses this to help gain a better understanding of how such systems
are best implemented. To this end, a model for web password recovery is
given, and existing techniques are documented and analysed within the
context of this model. This leads naturally to a set of recommendations
governing how such systems should be implemented to maximise security.
A range of issues for further research are also highlighted.
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1 Introduction
Despite their widely-documented limitations, passwords remain very widely used
for user authentication. However, although passwords are meant to be memo-
rized, humans often forget or mislay them. In some contexts this is easily man-
aged; for example, in an office environment, a user who forgets their password
for access to a multi-user system can simply see a system administrator, who
authenticates them and issues a new password. However, for web authentication,
the main focus of this paper, it is clearly not so simple; we refer to the process
of re-establishing a password in this case as web password recovery.
Most websites requiring users to create an account support password recovery,
enabling legitimate users who forget their password to continue to use the web-
site. This can be achieved in many ways, including use of a pre-registered email
address or mobile phone number, and/or involving other pre-set fall-back means
of authentication. However, many of these techniques introduce vulnerabilities
which may enable an impostor to falsely change a password, either causing a de-
nial of service or, in the worst case, enabling the impostor to authenticate as the
user. In this paper, we analyze these issues by first introducing a general model
for password recovery, and then examining various existing password recovery
options within the context of this model. We also use the model to look at ways
of improving the security and/or usability of password recovery.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we re-
view prior art on password recovery, noting that much of the existing work on
password recovery does not match the scope of this paper. This is followed in
section 3 by a general model for web password recovery, intended to capture the
commonly used approaches. Section 4 then reviews the various ways in which
password recovery is performed in practice, within the context of the model. This
then enables us in section 5 to provide a systematic assessment of the security
strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches, along with potential usability
issues. In section 6 we use the results of this assessment to provide a series of rec-
ommendations on the design of password recovery systems. Section 7 concludes
the paper, including a discussion of possible directions for further research.
2 Prior Art
Many authors have looked at web password recovery, mostly focussing on partic-
ular classes of recovery system or the shortcomings of widely used approaches.
– Several authors have looked at ways to securely store backup copies of pass-
words on a client device; this is outside the scope of password recovery as we
define it, since the web service itself is not involved. We briefly mention two
papers of this type. Ellison et al. [5] describe how a locally stored copy of a
password can be held in encrypted form, protected using answers to personal
questions; the encryption key is derived from these questions in such a way
that correct answers to k of n questions enables it to be reconstructed, allow-
ing the user to forget some of the answers. Somewhat analogously, Frykholm
and Juels [6] propose a provably secure technique for fault-tolerant password
recovery; a secret password is stored protected by a collection of low entropy
secrets, such that recovery is possible with only a subset of these secrets.
This again enables the user to maintain secured backup copies of passwords,
and hence, like the Ellison et al. scheme, it is outside the scope of this paper.
– Chmielewski et al. [4] focus on what they call client-server password recovery.
They propose a series of protocols that allow a user to automatically recover
a password from a server using partial knowledge of the password, and prove
their security in a formal model. This can be regarded as a contribution to
theoretical cryptography, rather than as a practical solution to the everyday
problem of web password recovery.
– Mannan et al. [15] propose a scheme for password recovery rather different
from many commonly used approaches. They propose that websites maintain
copies of user passwords encrypted under a public key for which the user
holds the private key on a personal mobile device (PMD). When the user
invokes the recovery service, the website sends the encrypted copy to the
user, who uses his/her her PMD to decrypt it.
– Kharudin et al. [13] describe a graphical user authentication method and
propose its use for password recovery. However, the main focus is on the
authentication technique rather than on the password recovery process.
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All the prior art we have so far described, whilst relating to password recovery,
falls outside our scope here, since the proposals are either independent of the
web server or require major changes in how clients and servers interact. However,
as we describe next, some authors have addressed the problem we consider here.
– A recent study by Stavova et al. [19] examines the usability of two pass-
word recovery techniques, namely backup codes and the use of trusted as-
sociates (social authentication). They examined a particular scheme where
the backup value is stored as a QR code, to address the issue of backup
codes being forgotten and/or written in clear text. They also considered a
case where the account holder and a trusted associate can each retrieve a
password share from a call centre, where the shares must be combined to
obtain the password.
– Guri et al. [9] point out how details revealed during password recovery can
be used to learn potentially sensitive personal user information.
– A number of authors have examined the security of challenge questions, a
secondary means of user authentication widely used in real-world password
recovery (see section 4.1). In 2008, Rabkin [17] examined leaks of answers
to these questions via social media. In the following year, Just et al. [11]
performed extensive surveys of user behaviour to analyse the relative secu-
rity offered by various questions. In parallel work, also published in 2009,
Schechter et al. [18] looked at the security properties of security questions as
a secondary means of user authentication in the context of password recov-
ery. In 2015, Bonneau et al. [2] conducted a study using a real-world data set
to examine the security and memorability of security questions. A yet more
recent study by Gelernter et al. [7] describes a possible man-in the-middle
(MitM) attack on password recovery by using the registration process for a
malicious MitM website to gather the information needed (e.g. answers to
personal questions) to conduct recovery for a different website.
3 A General Model
We now present a general model for a password recovery system. It provides
a framework within which we can examine the security of various options for
the recovery process. As discussed above, password recovery is a process which
enables users to re-establish a password for a website account. Sometimes referred
to as password reset1, password recovery is typically performed when a user
forgets the password for a website. There are a variety of ways in which password
recovery can be performed, some more secure than others, and the general model
is intended to capture all the means of password recovery in current use.
3.1 Constituent Processes
A password recovery process typically involves three sub-processes, namely:
1 We avoid this terminology since it implies changing the existing password, and not
all password recovery schemes involve such a change.
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– registration, in which user-specific information to be used during password
recovery is captured by the website,
– password setup, in which the user chooses and sends the website a new
password for that site, and
– recovery, where the user interacts with the website with the goal of re-
establishing a shared secret password.
Typically, the first of these will be performed just once, the second will be
performed infrequently, and the third will be performed whenever necessary.
These three sub-processes are next examined in greater detail.
3.2 Registration
In establishing an account with the website, a user typically sets up a user name
and password, as well as other information for use in the recovery process. This
information is used to ensure the security of the recovery process, i.e. to help
prevent an unauthorized party from changing the password to cause a denial
of service, or, even worse, obtaining a valid password for the account. Existing
categories of information of this type are examined in section 4.1.
3.3 Password Setup
We assume the website uses a password to authenticate the user, and so both
initially (probably as part of registration) and whenever the user wishes to change
it, the user will need to supply the website with a password. Other information,
e.g. a ‘password hint’, may be collected at the same time. Further examples of
information that might be gathered in this stage are given in section 4.2.
3.4 Recovery
Password recovery is typically invoked by a user when he/she forgets the pass-
word for a website. Such a process typically has three stages, as follows.
1. Recovery request. This involves the user signalling to the website to re-
quest password recovery. The website will typically provide a means for this
to occur, e.g. a special button.
2. Request validation. The website checks that the request is valid. A website
may perform user authentication at this stage, obviously using a means other
than the password, although by no means all websites do this. The website
may also attempt to verify that the request originates from a human rather
than a bot, e.g. using a CAPTCHA [1].
3. Password re-establishment. At the conclusion of this stage, if successful,
the user is equipped with a valid password for the website. There are two
main implementation approaches.
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– The password recovery system can help the user remember (recover)
his/her password; this will typically involve the system keeping a copy
of every user password, and password recovery will involve reminding
the user what it is (typically after he/she has been authenticated).
– The password recovery system can help the user set up a new password,
often referred to as password reset. This may involve the system giving
the user a temporary password, which the user must change at first use.
Regardless of the particular implementation approach, the recovery process
will typically involve using a secure communications channel to the user, e.g.
based on a previously registered email address or phone number. Examples of
how each of these steps might be executed are provided in sections 4.3 and 4.4.
4 Model Components
We next examine how the model components can be instantiated. The various
options introduced here are critically analyzed later in the paper.
4.1 Registration
Registration for the password recovery is typically implemented as part of a
general registration process, in which the user establishes a new account (known
as registering or signing up). As well as gathering information, it may also in-
volve security-related steps, e.g. solving a CAPTCHA to prevent automated user
account harvesting. It often involves collecting a wide range of information, in-
cluding matters not relevant to password recovery (e.g. payment information);
we focus only on information related to password recovery. Such information can
be divided into two main categories:
– personal information, i.e. information about the individual that may be used
for a range of purposes apart from password recovery;
– recovery information, i.e. information used only for password recovery.
A website will also typically require the user to choose a unique user name
(or give an email address to function as a user name) as well as a password;
these two pieces of information are obviously key to password recovery, although
given their special status we do not include them in this classification. We next
look at examples of widely used information types of both categories.
Personal information The following are examples of the types of personal
information that may be gathered during registration and subsequently used for
password recovery. In each case, examples of websites are given which use the
type of information specified in a password recovery process.
– name (first name, last name), e.g. as gathered by Instagram2;
2 https://goo.gl/sG4wDv, accessed: 09/04/2018
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– gender, e.g. as collected by Facebook3;
– birth date (day, month, year), e.g. as gathered by Google Mail4;
– street address (street name, city, country), e.g. as used by Microsoft email5;
– email address, e.g. as collected by Amazon6;
– phone number (e.g. mobile number), e.g. as gathered by Twitter7.
Recovery information The types of information established purely for pass-
word recovery purposes vary widely, depending on the detailed operation of the
recovery process. We can identify the following general categories.
– Recovery authentication information, i.e. information that can be used
to authenticate the user. Examples include the following.
• Answers to security questions: the website may give a list of security
questions (also known as personal knowledge or challenge questions), for
a user-selectable subset of which the user must provide answers. These
questions cover topics which the user can easily remember since they re-
late to the user’s personal life, e.g. school name, mother’s maiden name,
pet name, memorable street address, birthplace, favorite colour, etc. Ex-
amples of websites that request answers to security questions during
registration include Apple and Google. In addition, some websites, e.g.
Alipay.com, allow users to customize the question, i.e. the user provides
both the question and the answer.
• One-time recovery (backup) codes: a website may set up one or
more one-time backup codes, which the user must securely retain for
possible future use for account recovery. These backup codes are typi-
cally not used for password recovery as we define it here, but for closely
related purposes. In particular, Facebook and Google both support the
establishment of such codes to enable users to recover account access if
a second authentication factor fails or is unavailable, e.g. if a one-time
password sent via SMS or email cannot be accessed by the user. Of
course, such backup codes could also be used for password recovery but,
since we are not aware of any websites using them in this way, we do not
discuss them further in this paper.
– Recovery contact details, i.e. special contact details, such as an email
address or phone number, that are used for password recovery. Examples of
such details include the following.
• Contact details for trusted associates (trustees): i.e. email ad-
dresses or phone numbers for one or more individuals trusted by the
account holder, e.g. as used by Facebook. During password recovery, a
verification code is sent to a trustee, who is trusted to relay it to the
correct user.
3 https://goo.gl/wCsLMk, accessed: 09/04/2018
4 https://goo.gl/b67119, accessed: 09/04/2018
5 https://goo.gl/9hbHNX, accessed: 09/04/2018
6 https://goo.gl/yrv1fA, accessed: 09/04/2018
7 https://goo.gl/uUYysF, accessed: 09/04/2018
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• Recovery email address: i.e. one or more email addresses to which
a one-time password or a link to a special recovery page is sent by the
website during the recovery process.
• Recovery phone number: i.e. a phone number used to send a one-time
password for recovery purposes.
– Recovery preferences can be gathered at this stage if a website offers
more than one option for password recovery. The user preference can be
established during registration, or, as is the case for Google, the user is
simply offered various options if the password recovery process is invoked.
4.2 Password Setup
As part of the process of entering a password, the website may gather and store
the following types of information.
– Password hints: when a password is entered, some websites also request a
hint, intended to help the user remember the password. Alternatively, some
websites, e.g. Google (see figure 1), record the time when the password was
last changed, and subsequently use this information as a password hint when
the user makes a password recovery request.
– Old passwords: some websites, e.g. Gmail, keep old (superseded) pass-
words, to enable their use for authentication during password recovery.
Fig. 1. Google passwor change hint
4.3 Recovery Request and Validation
We consider the request and validation steps together since, in practice, these
steps are often combined. A website will typically provide a simple means for a
user to invoke the password recovery process, e.g. by providing a link somewhere
close to the password field in the login page. Once invoked the user will typically
be asked to perform one or more of the following steps in order to prevent the
acceptance of fraudulent requests:
8 Fatma Al Maqbali and Chris J Mitchell
– solve a CAPTCHA — some websites, e.g. PayPal, use a CAPTCHA during
password recovery to filter out automated attacks;
– answer one or more of the pre-established security questions, e.g. as per-
formed by Apple;
– select an option for password recovery (if the user registered multiple meth-
ods), e.g. as is the case for Amazon;
– enter the last password the user can recall, e.g. as requested by Google.
Following initial acceptance of the request, a user may be required to engage
in further interactions to validate the request, e.g. as follows.
– An email is sent to the user’s registered address, and the user is asked to
perform a task using information contained in the email, e.g. clicking on an
embedded link or entering a code value.
– An SMS (text) message containing a secret code is sent to the user’s regis-
tered mobile number, and the user is requested to enter this code; alterna-
tively the user may receive an automated call to his/her mobile phone and
be asked to engage in a short dialogue.
4.4 Password Re-establishment
We next review some commonly used methods for re-establishing a password.
– Email reset involves a website sending a message containing secret in-
formation to the registered email address of the user requesting recovery.
Subsequent use of this information implicitly authenticates the user, assum-
ing that only the user can access emails sent to his/her email address. This
approach is very widely used; Bonneau et al. [3] found that 92% of the 138
websites they tested use email-based password recovery. Various types of
secret information are commonly sent, e.g. as follows.
• Verification codes/temporary passwords are a temporary means of
accessing the user account, purely for the purposes of establishing a new
password, and are used, for example, by Amazon and Wikipedia — see
Figure 2. Note that Wikipedia limits users to one temporary password
per 24-hour period, and its temporary passwords expire after a week.
• Links (URLs) are embedded in emails sent to a user-registered address.
Clicking on such a link (which typically contains a secret string) redirects
the user browser to a page enabling the user to set up a new password.
Some websites, e.g. Twitter, limit the validity period of such links.
– SMS reset messages are sent to the user’s registered mobile number, and
typically contain a secret verification code (analogously to email reset).
– Use of an old password is permitted by some websites, e.g. Google, as a
means of authenticating a user for password recovery. Typically, it will form
only part of the process of authenticating the user.
– Use of a trustee is supported by some websites (e.g. Facebook), where the
trustee is used as a secure communications channel to the account holder for
sending secret recovery information, such as a temporary (one-time) pass-
word.
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Fig. 2. Wikipedia password recovery using a temporary password
4.5 After Password Re-establishment
After a user has reset his/her password, some websites immediately log out the
user and require a fresh log-in with the new password; others allow the user to
continue without logging-in again. In parallel with this, some websites notify the
account holder via email that password recovery has occurred, with the goal of
alerting users if the recovery was not authorised by the account holder.
5 Security and Usability Issues
We now consider potential security and usability issues for the recovery valida-
tion and password re-establishment techniques given in sections 4.3 and 4.4.
5.1 Security Questions
As observed in section 4.3, security questions are widely used to help ensure
that a recovery request is valid. As discussed in section 2, apart from the fact
that gathering such personal data potentially endangers user privacy, a range
of serious security and usability issues have been identified. Bonneau et al. [2]
identify the following problems.
– Answers to some questions are more readily guessed than others since they
have a small answer space; such questions offer relatively little protection.
– Some users may provide false answers with the goals of limiting what is
revealed about them and making it harder for impostors to guess their re-
sponses. However, users may forget their false answers, making the security
questions useless in the recovery process.
– Although the questions are designed to cover topics which users will always
know, some questions may nevertheless require the user to remember the
answer they gave, e.g. which of many pet names they chose, or which colour
they said was their favourite. Given such questions are likely to be used very
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infrequently, and considerable time may elapse between setting them up and
using them, a user’s recollection of the ‘correct’ answers is likely to fade.
– Cultural differences can have an impact on the memorability of some ques-
tions, e.g. Bonneau et al. [2] found that, for a typical set of questions, French
users are most likely to recall their first phone number and are least likely
to recall their father’s middle name.
Also, the answers to some questions could be obtained via social media, as dis-
cussed by Rabkin [17]. Even more seriously, the same questions are used by many
sites, making possible the type of MitM attack described by Gelernter et al. [7]
(see section 5.5), where a malicious site persuades a user to register with answers
to security questions which are then used to impersonate the user to another site.
The real issue here is that the authentication information (answers to security
questions) is not site-specific; analogous problems arise when users employ the
same password with many sites — this has caused many well-documented se-
curity problems, notably when passwords for one site are compromised and can
then be used to try to impersonate users to other sites8.
The main lessons from this analysis would appear to be that: (a) security
questions should be carefully chosen to maximise the level of security offered; (b)
security questions only offer a limited level of security and should always be used
in combination with other methods; and (c) ideally authentication information
should somehow be made site-specific.
5.2 Trustee-based Recovery
As discussed by Gong and Wang [8], there are a number of security issues with
relying on trusted ‘friends’ of a user to support password recovery.
– The account holder may forget who they chose as trustees, so that an indi-
vidual may remain a nominated trustee even if they are no longer trusted.
That is, the state of trust can change with time and a user could forget to
remove a trustee from list.
– Use of trustees can be prone to ‘forest fire attacks’ [8], where compromise of
a trustee account can compromise many other accounts.
– Users are sometimes obliged to nominate several trustees, e.g. Facebook
mandates three. This may force the user to select less trusted associates.
– A malicious trustee could take over an account by triggering password re-
covery and (if necessary) comunicating with other trustees (e.g. using social
engineering) to obtain all the secret information necessary.
8 This analysis suggests a very simple attack on passwords, where a malicious entity
sets up a site and persuades users to register and choose an ID and password; the
site can then act on the assumption that some users will employ the same user
name/password combinations elsewhere, and can try them out with other sites to
see if they work. Such an attack could be very effective without even requiring any
real-time MitM activity or compromise of existing password databases.
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5.3 Email Reset
A major vulnerability of this approach is its assumption that emails cannot be
intercepted. There are various ways this assumption could be invalidated.
– If emails are retrieved via an unencrypted link, e.g. if the user accesses email
via a browser and the website does not use https, or if a mail client em-
ploys IMAP over a link not protected using SSL/TLS, then emails might be
intercepted. This threat is particularly significant when using public access
networks; a MitM attacker operating a ‘fake’ public wireless access network
could intercept emails received via SMTP.
– If the reset email is forwarded to a third party, either accidentally or delib-
erately, then the contents could be compromised.
– Malware in the client device could be used to obtain the reset email. For
example, Gelernter et al. [7] describe a malicious android application which,
if installed, can covertly read received emails.
The use of email for distributing reset information also has other risks. For
example, consider the case where the website for which password recovery is
being performed is itself a provider of an email service (e.g. Google). In this
case, sending a password reset message by email will not help, as the user will
not be able to log in to retrieve it. In such a case it is common practice for the
user to be asked to register an alternative email address to be used to distribute
recovery information. During password recovery, in some cases the user will be
shown a partially obfuscated version of this alternative email address, and the
user will be asked to confirm that this is the correct address for use in password
recovery. Figures 3 and 4 show this process as used by Gmail. This is a clear
privacy breach, in that it may well be possible for a third party to learn the
entire alternative address, e.g. by a web search or by automated harvesting of
email addresses [9] (see, for example, Polakis et al. [16]).
Apart from the risk of spam, restricting access to email addresses is clearly
desirable given that email addresses are often used as user identifiers. A further
possible problem arising with the use of email relates to the non-permanent
nature of email addresses. A user may register an email address which may later
become re-assigned to someone else, e.g. because they change service providers
or employers. In such a case, a password reset message may be received by a
third party, who could use it to take control of the user account. Another issue
could arise in a work environment in which employee emails are temporarily
forwarded to another person, e.g. because the employee is sick or on leave; this
could be especially hazardous if the forwardee is temporary or a contract worker.
5.4 Verification Codes and Reset Links
As discussed in section 4.4, there are two main ways email reset can be used
for password recovery, namely by sending a verification code or a reset link. As
discussed above, both give rise to a risk if the reset email is compromised. Apart
from the direct compromise threat, both have other security and usability issues.
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Fig. 3. Partial leakage of user con-
tact number
Fig. 4. Partial leakage of alterna-
tive email address
– The following issues are associated with verification codes.
• Lack of entropy: since verification codes are typically short numeric val-
ues, they are potentially vulnerable to brute force searching attacks. That
is, if a website does not limit the number of attempts to enter the code,
then a simple brute force attack becomes possible, as demonstrated by
a successful attack on two Facebook sites [20].
• As discussed in greater detail in section 5.5 in the context of codes sent
via SMS, a user could be misled into revealing a verification code to a
malicious site in a type of phishing attack.
– Reset links have a slightly different set of associated issues.
• Some websites do not expire unused reset links, i.e. they remain valid
indefinitely. For example, in an experiment we discovered that a link for
rosegal.com remained valid for at least five months. Since it is hard to
understand why a link needs to be valid for more than a few hours, this
represents an unnecessary risk, since if such a link is ever disclosed it
may enable the associated account to be hijacked.
• Karlof et al. [12] describe a phishing attack on reset link-based password
recovery. The attacker starts password recovery on a website for a target
user, knowing this will cause the website to send an email containing
a link to the target user. Simultaneously the attacker emails the user
asking them to paste the link in an email they are about to receive into
an attacker-controlled website; a similar attack works against verification
codes in emails. This attack is similar to the Gelernter et al. [7] attack
on SMS-based password recovery (see section 5.5).
5.5 SMS Reset
There are a variety of issues associated with the use of SMS reset messages,
many of which are analogous to issues associated with email reset.
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– Since codes sent to mobile phones are typically only six numeric digits9,
i.e. there are only 106 possibilities, this means that it may be possible to
successfully guess a code value. It is therefore imperative that websites limit
the number of entry attempts a user is permitted.
– As noted in section 5.1, Gelernter et al. [7] describe an MitM attack on
password recovery: the registration process for a malicious website is used
to gather the answers to personal security questions in order to successfully
complete request validation for a website with which the user already has
an account. Of course, this MitM step does not complete the attack, as
the attacked website will typically, after receiving the correct answers to
security questions, send a verification code (e.g. via SMS) to the genuine
user. To complete the attack, the malicious website (as part of its registration
procedure) tells the user to expect a message containing a verification code
which should be entered into the registration page. If the user enters the
verification code received from the attacked website, the malicious website
will now have what it needs to complete the process of capturing the user’s
account. The only defence against this attack is for the message containing
the verification code to make it clear which website it is intended for (i.e.
the attacked website rather than the malicious website).
This attack will work against verification codes sent via email or SMS, al-
though it is much harder for the sending website to make clear how the
code should be used in a 160-character SMS message than in an email. In-
deed, Gelernter et al. [7] describe the results of a detailed survey of the use
of SMS-based verification codes, with the goal of understanding both how
clear the SMS messages are, and how likely users are to mistakenly enter a
code intended for one website into a box on a different website. They go on
to make a series of recommendations regarding how SMS messages should be
designed to minimise the likelihood that a user can be deceived. They also
recommend that the verification code should have a short validity period.
– In some countries, network coverage in rural areas is often poor or non-
existent, meaning it may not be possible for a user to obtain a verification
code sent via SMS. Similarly, if a user is traveling, he/she may not be able to
receive the SMS. Also, occasionally SMS messages are delayed, which may
cause the user to initiate many requests.
– Just as for email reset, the security of SMS reset relies on the assumption
that an SMS message is a secure channel to the user. Again, as for email
reset, this assumption can be invalidated in a range of ways, e.g. as follows.
• Guri et al. [7] describe an attack based on an apparently harmless An-
droid app which can monitor and redirect SMS messages to an attacker
server. If such an app was installed, then a password recovery SMS might
be compromised.
• If the phone to which the SMS reset is sent is stolen then the con-
tents of the SMS reset message could be compromised; even if the phone
is password-locked, the message may still be compromised since many
9 Google and Dropbox both use 6–digit verification codes
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phones display the contents of received SMS messages without requiring
the phone to be unlocked.
• SMS reset messages could be intercepted at the network operator, e.g.
by a malicious employee, or when sent over the air interface if the air
interface link is not encrypted (as is the case in some countries). The
reset message could also be intercepted by an unauthorised base station
(an IMSI catcher or ‘Stingray’) [14] or by exploiting weaknesses in im-
plementations of the SS7 protocol used by telecomunication companies
to communicate with each other [21].
• If the user changes his/her phone number and forgets to notify the web-
site, then the SMS reset message will be received by the new owner of
that number.
5.6 Other Issues
We conclude this discussion of existing password recovery techniques by briefly
reviewing certain other issues which have a bearing on the security and/or us-
ability of the password recovery process.
– Use of an old password as the only means of user authentication for password
recovery is clearly dangerous, since one reason a user might replace a pass-
word is because it has been, or is suspected of having been, compromised.
It also seems relatively unlikely that a user will recollect an old password if
they cannot remember their current password.
– Many web services use an email address as a user ID, e.g. Amazon, Facebook,
Dropbox, Instagram, Twitter and LinkedIn. This has the major advantage
of making it easy for the user to remember their account identifier, and it is
also convenient for web service providers to deliver account-related functions
via email as well as simplifying registration. However, as discussed by Jin
et al. [10], there are significant risks associated with such an approach, not
least that an attacker automatically knows one of the two parts of a user
credential set, thereby facilitating attacks on the password recovery process.
– Password hints may reveal sensitive information, potentially endangering
user security or privacy. For example, the Google password hint shown in
figure 1 indicates when the user last changed his/her password – this reveals
that Google was being used at that time. Whilst this may not seem so
significant, for some sites this could be far more revealing.
6 Towards Secure Password Recovery
We next provide recommendations on best practice in implementing a password
recovery system. These recommendations are based on the analysis given in the
previous section. We consider the two most security-significant steps in password
recovery, namely request validation and password re-establishment.
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6.1 Recovery Request Validation
As discussed in section 4.3, two main security-related steps are commonly used
during request validation, namely use of a CAPTCHA and security questions.
The CAPTCHA prevents automated attacks on password recovery, and appears
a reasonable step to include. Security questions are used to prevent malicious
triggering of password recovery, which could otherwise be done on a large scale,
e.g. using databases of email addresses (since user names are often the same as
email addresses). However, the use and effectiveness of security questions is ques-
tionable for a variety of reasons. Firstly, as discussed in section 5.1, the answers
can sometimes be readily guessed or obtained via social media, and, most seri-
ously, the MitM attacks of Gelernter et al. [7] suggest that they offer relatively
little protection. Secondly, there are significant privacy issues, since use of such
questions involves gathering personal data, which could be misused. Thirdly,
there are also usability issues, in that not all answers to questions can always be
readily recalled. It is therefore highly questionable whether using security ques-
tions as a filtering mechanism is worth the trouble, since while it offers limited
security it also has significant negative privacy and usability disadvantages.
6.2 Password Re-establishment
Depending on how password re-establishment works, there are a number of im-
portant recommendations which emerge from the analysis in section 5. We look
separately at three main areas: email reset, SMS reset, and the use of trustees.
Email reset If email reset is used, then the website must try to minimise the
chance that the email reaches an incorrect recipient. This means, for example,
that the email address to which the message is to be sent should ideally have
been used (or confirmed by the user) recently. This could be achieved by asking
the user to enter the email address to which the reset email should be sent, and
only if this matches with the address stored by the website should it be used.
If verification codes are sent via email, then the discussion in section 5.3
suggests that: (a) they should use as large an alphabet as possible (e.g. including
letters, digits and punctuation), and be as long as possible, subject to usability
constraints; and (b) they should expire after a short period of time.
Reset URLs sent in an email should: (a) have a short expiry period (just
as for codes); (b) contain a random (secret) string which should be sufficiently
long to make successful guessing attacks highly improbable; and (c) start with
‘https’, so that the connection to the server is secure.
SMS reset If SMS is used to deliver the means to re-establish a password, then
very similar requirements to those for email reset apply. That is, regardless of
what information is sent in the SMS, the website should try to ensure that the
phone number is current, e.g. by requesting the user to re-enter the number,
and only if it matches with the number stored by the website should it be used.
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Apart from the requirements applying to verification codes and links previously
mentioned, Gelernter et al. [7] give a list of recommendations aimed specifically
at verification codes sent via SMS. In particular: (a) the SMS message should
be designed so that the code is not displayed on the phone screen when locked,
i.e. forcing the user to unlock the phone to obtain the code; and (b) the wording
of the SMS should minimise the chance that the user can be deceived into sub-
mitting the code to the wrong website, including indicating the identity of the
sending website, the purpose of the message, and a warning not to divulge the
code to any other person or website.
Trustee-based password recovery Since significant risks arise from out of
date trustee data, as part of the recovery request process the account holder
should be asked to verify contact details for the trustee(s) to be used. For exam-
ple, the user could be asked to re-enter trustee email addresses or phone numbers,
with the website only using them if they match already stored values. Web sites
could also periodically require users to revalidate trustee data. Clear instruc-
tions should be sent with the password recovery information sent to a trustee,
to minimise the chance that a trustee is misled (e.g. via social engineering) into
disclosing the recovery data to the wrong party.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have given a general model for the password recovery process, and we have
also examined the range of ways in which this model is instantiated by today’s
websites. We then provided the first comprehensive review of known security and
privacy weaknesses in existing approaches to password recovery; we also exam-
ined usability issues. This then allowed us to make a series of recommendations
regarding how best a password recovery process should be designed.
There is clearly a need for further research in this important area, as well
as new, more secure, ways of performing recovery. Almost all the techniques in
common use are to some extent flawed, and many also pose privacy risks. One
direction for future work would be to conduct large scale practical trials to try
to understand better how users can interact with password recovery systems
both securely and reliably. A further issue which has hardly been explored is
that of account recovery, i.e. where a user forgets both his/her user name and
password, or a second authentication factor fails. A range of techniques are in
use for this purpose, e.g. backup codes (see 4.1), and the usability and security
of these techniques clearly merits further investigation.
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